Tactical Bushcraft Primer

“The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present.”---Abraham Lincoln

A quick scan of any defense or law enforcement budget shows that the overall trend is toward technology. It’s the same with the civilian and contractor industries. New fangled solutions offered up to solve timeless problems such as getting yourself fed, watered and out of the weather are, for the most part, overly expensive and dependent upon supply lines, service technicians or worse—customer support hotlines.

At the same time however, there is a sub-current of military, law enforcement and civilian individuals moving in the opposite direction. They are going against the grain and seeking the most simple, solid and flexible skills and gear by which to provide for basic and advanced operational needs.

Somewhere mixed in and over toward the other end of the spectrum is a small contingent of practitioners dedicated to reviving and preserving the essential survival skills used over the ages by all cultures. Friction fire, plant fiber technology (weaving, employing plant material for rope, etc.) stone tool fabrication and celestial navigation are all found in this sphere.

What we propose as an alternate to all of these extremes is a guideline of utility. One that states broadly:

Use anything and everything necessary to achieve adequate shelter, sustenance, hydration and warmth. Do not get locked into dogma one way or another. It is a hindrance to survival.

Perspective

Millennia ago, when primitive hunting cultures left home to procure meat for their tribes, it was tracking that often determined whether or not they were successful. The abilities—both gleaned from elders and improvised on the spot—to use the bounty of the natural environment must have played an enormous role in the survival of individual hunters and hunting bands. Insights into the various tools, supplements, raw materials and relationships found everyday in any given natural environment would make the difference between getting home if/when things went wrong on the hunt.

Somewhere along the timeline early man came to understand fire, projectile weapons, permanent and temporary shelters and—essentially—we progressed from there. Tracking and group hunting gave way to agriculture as the primary means of food procurement. Nomadic cultures adjusted to sedentary lifestyles and so on.

However, for thousands of years, right up through even the 1970’s and 80’s westernized culture retained vestiges (and in many cases, whole knowledge bases) of useful survival-related understanding. Modern tracking probably reached its apex in the form of two legendary collectives: the Apache Indians and the Rhodesian Tracker Combat Unit. Other units have achieved phenomenal tracking results, however these two seem to have established themselves in the historical and culture records as the true tracking and scout masters.

There is least one important commonality between these two groups: each of them had the capacity to not only live, but to thrive, for extended periods of time in complete and semi-isolation within the wild places where they plied their trade—and to do so with minimal outside support. Often times with none whatsoever.

When taken in the context of human survival desert southwest (Apache) and southern Africa (TCU), respectively, present very different challenges, pitfalls, rewards and needs. Yet, both of these tracker groups were able to consistently feed, water, shelter and generally sustain themselves under extreme stress, both physical and mental while engaging formidable enemies.

This brings up the point that while tracking and survival are both rooted in a fundamental framework that can translate from one environment to another, both skills also depend upon a familiarity those environments. Change the flora, fauna and climate and you’ve got a whole new set of challenges. The principles remain, but the specifics must be adjusted. So how do we train for the broadest possible application of these skills?

Reviewing/Renewing Origins

The word ‘tactical’ having devolved to little more than a marketing buzz work, gets overused, but the original meaning (My advantages go up and yours go down.) still contains an important value. In terms of tactical bushcraft we are simply talking about how you go about surviving while tracking.

What shelter do you choose and how will you make it; what will your water source be as you are led over an unknown landscape, sometimes for days; how are you going to eat and how are you going to regulate your core temperature? And most importantly how are you going to do all of that while maintaining your own security?

We are going to go about everything we do with the intention of leaving the absolute least signature possible. We are going to make our fires as unnoticeable as possible, our food give off the least odor and give up the least noise when harvested. We are going to procure water without leaving a trace and make our shelters with an eye towards both security and hasty movement—as it might be necessary at any point.

We are going to do it in a way that brings us the most possible advantage and brings the other guy the least. In other words, tactically.

Modern tactical trackers usually have the luxury of supply lines, but what of those situations where there are none? Do they give up the track? Wait for support/re-supply and lose the quarry?

It would depend on the tracking team and their capabilities. If they can supply themselves from the environment and stay out an extra day (or more), then they should if it ultimately increases their odds of completing the mission. If they simply aren’t capable of this, then they are subject to the whims of outside forces and may potentially lose whatever tactical advantage they had built up.

A Flexible Framework

There are certain principles which will lay the foundation for such a team capability and we’ll close this article with them. Future installments will expand on these principles and provide mini-lessons on a few of the techniques as well as precise gear suggestions.

Should organizations be interested in further instruction, TÝR Group is capable of adding bushcraft components to any class.

Principle One

The environment is your grocery and hardware store—to a point.

Principle Two

Your gear is like a paintbrush, you still need paint, canvas and creativity to get anything done.

Principle Three

Maximum utility adheres to neither prejudice of method nor to doctrine.

The common idea behind all of these is more or less to do whatever you can with whatever you have while minimizing effort and maximizing return on that effort.

For example, unless we are training, it is frankly better to carry three Bic lighters in various places on your person AND know how to make a bow drill if you have to than to rely on one or the other. Likewise it is highly valuable to know how to make a primitive forge and manufacture a field blade out of an old leaf spring—however if we are on a mission we are carrying a large chopping knife and probably two smaller backups. If everything goes sideways and we are without weapons then we’ll start searching for a broken down Mercedes and get to making charcoal.

The British used to say, “Knowledge is light in the rucksack and can’t be left at home.” This is the essence of those principles above and speaks to the philosophy of mindset, knowledge and preparation—in that order. After the mindset of survival is deeply understood, every technique becomes little more than a trick, which can oftentimes only be used in a specific environment. Preparation and knowledge are sort of like the egg/chicken argument but if we are being sincere about it we’d rather be able to know how to handle the worst possible case and avoid it through preparation.

A. Edwards is a tracker, fieldcraft instructor and Wilderness-EMT/NREMT. At TÝR Group he provides expertise in wilderness survival, communications. A graduate of various survival, tactical and weapons-based schools, he also holds degrees in English and Film.

"Past & Current Issues in Intelligence Collection"

Jason W. Brokaw
February 25, 2011

The United States intelligence capability, like that of other countries, is an ever evolving arena. As with anything, the only constant is change. The key in the process of change in any arena is the constant improvement through the identification of what is working well, and what needs to be adjusted to become more effective. With the constant evolutionary changes through technology, new threats to the national security of the United States, and what is considered to be national interests, intelligence is an area that is no different. Historically, there have been individuals put in positions to identify what is working, and what is not. Several decades ago, William P. Bundy was one of these individuals assigned with the task of identifying where the intelligence community is maintaining the right direction, and where there are areas that need to be improved. In his article “Guiding of Intelligence Collection”, he references several areas that were and in some cases, still remain issues to be continually developed. However, there are a few areas that he neglected to mention, either due to the problem not existing, or an oversight due to the other issues he already identified. The areas of note that were missing in his article that can be found as an issue today are the areas of “hording” intelligence, duplication of effort, reinvention of already identified methods, and the over reliance on technology. To some, this may not seem issues, however these are issues that have been seen in current combat theaters that impede overall mission success.

First, some of the points that William P. Bundy identified in the past that are issues still being worked today. One of the areas he found as a problem was the complications between the various consumers and collection mechanisms. What he found was that there was not a central mechanism that attempts to do a thorough policing and sorting of requirements. This happens to be one area that has made major changes through the assigning of Collection Managers that have the capability to perform this function. The creation and development of Priority National Intelligence Objectives (PNIO) was another area that he found a problem. The problems identified were that they were too general, only stated “objectives” that were general guides to levy major collection projects, and lacked the ability to forecast what may turn into a crisis at any given time. Is this still a problem? It can probably still be considered an issue, as the current United States administration has not clearly identified what the end state goals are to the current combat theaters the military is involved in. He also described the various issues found within the five steps to levying requirements. These include defining the requirement, informing the collector, choose the collector, servicing the return, and finally, evaluating and appraising. The five steps to levying requirements are always going to be a part of the intelligence community that will need improvement. At the very least, that area is one that should be looked at as something that can always be done better. Finally, he noted the issue of not having a consumer representative detailed directly to collection shops, and the including them in the planning of operations. This is still an area that is a problem. It will more than likely continue to be a problem, as consumers are not typically allowed to be involved in the collector arena due to sensitivity of the collection sources, and methods.[1]

The next areas that are going to be described are not typically found in most publications regarding the improvement of intelligence, but through the eyes of experience. The areas that can be identified that are not covered in his article can be started through the identification of the problem of “hording intelligence.” Maybe the word “hording” is too harsh of a word to use, but it definitely fits. Granted, there have been major improvements since the attack of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, but part of the reason that it was so successful was due to that very hording of information. The 9/11 Commission was able to find that to be the case on numerous occasions, which also lead to the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Office. This office was formed to pull the various intelligence agencies together, and break down the walls that proved to be so detrimental. There have been major improvements at the upper levels of the intelligence world, but there can definitely be a lot of major improvements at the lowest level. It is said that, knowledge is power. The power sought after by some in the intelligence arena is more of the identification of self worth in the field, and reputation as either a good analyst or collector. Sometimes, both do not realize that keeping certain resources and skills to one’s self can prove to be more damaging than being identified as an aid or resource. This problem directly effects overall intelligence collection due to information not being passed between unit boundaries in theater. The effect is the duplication of intelligence requirements to answer questions that have already been answered.

Duplication of effort has plagued the United States in both Iraq, and Afghanistan. This not only hinders the analyst and collector, but also creates an environment promoting competition where it should not be found. This, in turn, promotes the “hording” of intelligence mentioned earlier. An example of this can be found just in the various Significant Activity (SIGACT) databases that could be found as of 2006 in Iraq alone. There were at least three different SIGACT databases that all reported the same information. All three were supported by large groups of staff to maintain those databases. Today, the same problem is still found. Some units report SIGACTS in the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE), while others utilize the Command Post of the Future (CPOF).[2][3] Of course, neither of the systems can communicate with each other, and when some units rely on CIDNE to report incidents, they are unable to see various incidents due to various units using another system. To further enhance that problem, All Source Intelligence Analysts (35F) students are taught the use of the Distributed Common Ground System (DGCS) Multi-Function Workstation (MFWS).[4] The students receive information, to include SIGACTS, through this database tool. The MFWS is not the reporting tool, but the receiver so the analyst can manage the information coming in to analyze. Instead of teaching the students CIDNE or CPOF, which neither is taught, the students are taught MFWS. Since CIDNE is not considered a Program of Record, it is not recognized by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) as necessary to be taught, and has even been considered a rival to DCGS. The problem is that the students learn MFWS, however that system is not utilized in either combat theater. In essence, the system they are taught is only a system that is used during training. Not only is it only used during the student’s initial training, but it currently does not work when utilized during the Field Training Exercise (FTX) at the end of the course. Both of these examples directly drive the problem in identifying what intelligence needs to be collected to fill identified gaps. If information is being placed in multiple locations, there is no way for an analyst to be able to analyze incidents or reporting, because they do not know it exists if they are not looking in the right place.

There is currently a problem with the constant reinvention of already identified methods. Right now, there are working groups throughout the Army at the various military installations that are trying to identify the correct method to train soldiers in Site Exploitation Operations, and Document and Media Exploitation. The irony of this is that on June 8, 2010, Training Circular (TC) 2-91.8 Document and Media Exploitation, was published by the United States Army outlining the specific methods of performing Document and Media Exploitation, also known as DOMEX.[5] Furthermore, on July 8, 2010, Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-90.15 Site Exploitation Operations, was also published by the United States Army.[6] This publication supersedes Field Manual (FM) 3-90.15 that is dated April 25, 2007. So, needless to say, this is not a new concept. However, the United States Army is trying to reinvent what has already been doctrinally published within the same organization. Both publications describe in detail the collection of information that has intelligence value. So, why has the United States Army formed working groups at each installation to identify what has already been published? It is unknown, but the phenomena of reinvention have become a plague to not only the United States Army intelligence community, but the intelligence community as a whole.

Lastly, there is no doubt that technology is a wonderful thing. However, technology will be the first thing to fail you when you need it most. The overreliance on technology, particularly in the area of intelligence collection, creates a blindness that cannot be overcome if backup capabilities not technology based are not identified. In January 2007, China launched a ground-based missile that destroyed an aging satellite orbiting more than 500 miles in space.[7] Granted, the United States can do the same, however some of our greatest intelligence collection capabilities are in the air and space. When you look at what one of the main supporters of not only intelligence, but communications is in the United States, the satellite is one of the biggest keys to success. It does not stop at the satellite, but also down on the ground level. Intelligence analysts are completely reliant on computers, and sophisticated software to even do the most simple of tasks, such as link diagrams of groups/organizations. The complete reliance on PowerPoint to brief the current situation, or collection intelligence comes in the form of the Graphic Intelligence Summary (GRINTSUM). It would be unheard of to have the doctrinally accepted format of a typed in text Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) anymore, because the analyst cannot put the various colors, diagrams, maps, or pictures of High Value Individuals/Targets (HVI/HVT). On the extreme level, a missile can knock out the intelligence collection capabilities in numerous intelligence disciplines, and the simple flicking of a light switch can knock out the rest. When it comes down to the end result, there are backups to the technology that is relied on. Without satellites or electricity, the intelligence collector can’t send collected information, and the analyst does not have the backup tools to operate.

Although William P. Bundy has some very valid points he describes as issues within the intelligence community regarding intelligence collection, there are several points not presented. However, there are many points he did not identify decades ago, because the problems did not exist yet. Some of the same problems he identified are still present today, however they have been identified and are constantly being worked on. Unfortunately, a few of the other issues described have not, and only continue to be a problem. Bundy made a good point when he stated, “You simply can’t get people to confess their sins in front of others.” This statement is true, and until the realization of the problems regarding the “hording” intelligence, duplication of effort, reinvention of already identified methods, and the over reliance on technology, the new era of intelligence will move backwards, not forwards. With the continual evolutionary changes taking place in today’s world, there is not room for the absence of improvement in intelligence collection.

Bibliography

[1] Bundy, William P., “Guiding of Intelligence Collection”, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Historical Review Program, Release as Sanitized [September 18, 1995]. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol3no1/html/v03i1a04p_0001.htm [accessed February 24, 2011].

[2] Intelligence Software Solutions, “Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE)”. http://www.issinc.com/solutions/cidne.html [accessed February 24, 2011].

[3] General Dynamics, “Command Post of the Future (CPOF),” General Dynamics C4 Systems, [September 23, 2008]. http://www.gdc4s.com/documents/cpof_datasheet_web.pdf [accessed February 24, 2011].

[4] Flynn, Erin, “Mapping the Human Terrain”, Geospatial Intelligence Forum: Official Publication of the United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation. http://www.geospatial-intelligence-forum.com/geospatial-intelligence-forum/geospatial-intelligence-forum/-issue-2/930-mapping-the-human-terrain.html [accessed February 24, 2011].

[5] Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Training Circular (TC) 2-91.8: Document and Media Exploitation,” Department of the Army, [June 8, 2010].

[6] Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-90.15: Site Exploitation Operations,” Department of the Army, [July 8, 2010].

[7] Kaufman, Marc and Dafna Linzer, “China Criticized for Anti-Satellite Missile Test,” Washington Post [January 19, 2007]. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/18/AR2007011801029.html [accessed February 23, 2011].